Why France Remains Important for India and the EU’s Marginal Impact
By Sapna Suresh
From February 10-12, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in France to attend the AI Action Summit in Paris that India is co-hosting. Aside from attending the AI Action Summit, Modi met with French President Emmanuel Macron and in the last leg of his trip, Modi visited Marseille to inaugurate India’s new consulate. Opening up an Indian consulate in Marseille also has an symbolic meaning, since it is where Indian soldiers who served in the world wars are buried and was where Indian freedom fighter, Veer Savarkar, escaped prior to being handed over to the British. Aside from the historical connection, the southern French city of Marseille is being described as the European entry point for the India- Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Modi’s visit to France once again emphasizes the overarching strategic significance of the Franco-Indian bilateral relationship.
India and France share a close historical relationship, as Pondicherry (now in the state of Tamil Nadu) was a former French colony. Today, many Indians who live in Paris, especially in areas around Gare du Nord and La Chappelle, are Tamilians from Pondicherry. Later, Sri Lankan Tamils moved to France to flee the civil war in Sri Lanka, creating a vibrant Tamil community in Paris.
Since 1998, France has been one of India’s key strategic partners when French President Jacques Chirac visited India at a time when India was criticized and sanctioned by the Americans for its 1998 nuclear weapons test.
One of the key reasons France remains a key strategic partner for India is that both countries share a similar worldview of maintaining strategic autonomy, or foreign policy independence. In fact, Kanehara Nobukatsu, a former deputy national security advisor to the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe remarked that, “We know they (India) will be a very difficult superpower—like a big France.”
In India, non-alignment continues to guide Indian foreign policy by insisting the ability to have cordial relations with all the major powers and having solidarity with other postcolonial countries. France, despite being a member of NATO, the foreign policy doctrine of Gaullism has emphasized the need to maintain grandeur in foreign affairs and reduce dependence on the U.S. Today, this shared worldview of foreign policy sovereignty has played a key role in facilitating Indo-French perception of the Indo-Pacific. As President Macron reiterated in a television interview, India and France want to work with the U.S and China, but do not want to be dependent on either.
However, when examining the Franco-Indian relationship, the European Union’s role should not be dismissed.
On the one hand, Macron is one of France’s most pro-EU French president, as he regularly insists on the need for a common European defense and insisting on a collective European front against challenges emanating from China, Russia, and under a second Trump term. On the other hand, Macron has also emphasized the need to elevate French sovereignty and influence, much like any other French president.
When examining Franco-Indian relations, it puts into spotlight this very dilemma of wanting to maintain a collective European position while also ensuring French influence. One example relates to India’s relationship with Russia, which has been under scrutiny ever since Russia invaded Ukraine. On the one hand, France’s own view toward Russia has grown increasingly hawkish, such as when in April 2024, France’s former foreign affairs minister, Stéphane Séjourné, said dialogue with Russia was no longer in French interests. In December 2024, the French government publicly supported EU sanctions toward entitles aiding the Russian War (such as Chinese companies) and Russia’s destabilization operations worldwide, such as in Africa.
However, at the same time, France has not criticized India’s policy toward Russia on a bilateral basis. In fact, France continues to see India as an important market to sell its weapons, such as the Rafale fighter jets. France’s silence toward India’s relations with Russia illustrates the broader contradictions of wanting to insist on a common European stance vis à vis Moscow while at the same time, forging deeper cooperation with New Delhi as part its desire to maintain influence in the Indo-Pacific. While the EU allows for individual member-states such as France to have considerable autonomy in foreign and defense policy, such a stark contradiction in France’s own policies by viewing Russia as a existential threat to European security while also selling arms to a country that helps Russia economically, illustrate the limits of multilateral organizations.
Despite the rhetorical pledge for European unity, France’s relations with India illustrate the reality that in the context of a flux in the international stage, these bilateral relationships are becoming more influential than multilateral organizations.
