20’th CCP National Congress Special Issue 03: Politically Loyal and Preparing for Conflict.

Written By Robert Bray

Edited by Ava Holtzman, and Josh Blaustein

This October, the Chinese Communist Party held its 20th National Congress which further cemented President Xi Jinping’s (习近平) control over China’s economy, society, and military. President Xi is fully aware of the looming conflicts brewing along the Sino-Indian border and within the East and South China Seas and their destabilizing potential. To address these threats to Chinese security interests, he seeks to modernize, expand, and affirm the allegiance of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and ensure that China is capable of fighting and winning regional wars.  It is important for international observers and leaders to note the implications of President Xi’s consolidation of power over the Chinese military and its effect on the PLA’s policies, strategies, and capabilities. We may soon enter a dangerous and militarized period of great power competition and the PLA will continue to be a crucial factor. 

In order to understand the PLA’s trajectory, one must first understand President Xi’s ambitious bid for control over the PLA, as well ashis position on its decades-long modernization project. President Xi first obtained dominance over the military through his elevation to chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and then through an expansive anti-corruption campaign that purged the potentially disloyal and ostentatiously corrupt alike. These moves ultimately allowed President Xi to pursue his vision for the PLA’s modernization unencumbered. This vision is summarized by China’s 2027 centennial military modernization goals which include; increased mechanization, and informatization, the renovation of military doctrine, the prioritization of quality and efficiency, and the simultaneous buildup of military and economic strength. President Xi has all but ensured the PLA’s continued faithfulness to these goals through moves made at the 20th National Party Congress.

This National Party Congress, President Xi has appointed PLA Generals and Politburo members He Weidong (何卫东) and the 72-year-old Zhang Youxia (张又侠), to the positions of Vice Chairmen of China’s CMC. General He commands the PLA’s Eastern Theater and oversaw joint military exercises in the proximity of Taiwan after Representative Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island while General Zhang is a veteran of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the 1984 Battle of Laoshan. These appointments may indicate President Xi is seeking politically loyal yet operationally experienced commanders amid increased tensions with both the Republic of China and the United States, even if it means violating protocol for age restrictions and political experience.

Evidence of the continued dominance of President Xi’s agenda can also be seen by his report to the 20th National Party Congress that reemphasized the importance of the previously established 2027 PLA modernization goals along with and sought to increase China’s ability to deploy forces in order to, “shape our security posture, deter and manage crises and conflicts, and win local wars.” This report also mentioned the building of, “a strong system of deterrent forces,” likely alluding to China’s plan to continue its large-scale build-up of nuclear weapons aimed at countering U.S. advancements and bolstering the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. President Xi’s report to the 20th National Party Congress and its emphasis on national security and increased military capacity dovetail with a growing anxiety over mounting external threats. Ultimately from the CPC’s perspective, China today faces looming, alarming, but currently unaddressed, “gray rhino” events that require a modernized and loyal PLA to counter.

However despite the ambitious pronouncements of President Xi and the CPC, China will face substantial challenges in its pursuit of a modernized PLA.  U.S. imposed export controls and restrictions on high-tech semiconductors and other technologies could potentially hobble the PLA’s efforts in attaining greater mechanization, informatization, andInterservice rivalry and warfighting inexperience are substantial roadblocks that hamper China’s pursuit of the joint warfighting capabilities that have already been developed by the United States. And of all the challenges the PLA faces, economic and budgetary problems will perhaps be the most daunting. The combination of slowing economic growth and an increased operational tempo will lead to some difficult choices regarding resource allocation that may leave PLA modernization worse off and increasingly distant.

The PLA post 20th National Party Congress still seeks to achieve President Xi’s vision of becoming a politically loyal and technologically advanced “world-class military” by 2049, but an increased anxiety regarding external pressures have elevated the urgency and importance of the PLA’s modernization. The 20th National Party Congress has highlighted these threats and their implications to Chinese national security and President Xi’s handpicked CMC will strive in the coming years to ensure the PLA overcomes its challenges and becomes a fighting force capable of ardently countering these threats and facilitating China’s rise as a great power.

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20’th CCP National Congress Special Issue 04: China’s Strategic Energy Issues

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20’th CCP National Congress Special Issue 03: China’s Socio-Economics issues