Left-Wing Populism in Germany and The Struggle For A Consensus on Russia
By Stanislaw Biskupski
The smoothing of a magazine or a flutter of typing on a laptop will bring one to a series of analyses of Europe’s rising populist right and their varying degrees of russophilia. This is a legitimate concern. But the far-left, too, is striding often for different reasons up the polls and towards the same geopolitical vision. Russia has been less damaged by tariffs than hoped, has been able to make due with their stockpiles, and can source classic cannon-fodder from unconventional sources like North Koreans and Buryats. The far-left and far-right’s union on their stance towards Russia yet divergence in their bases and on other policies is a case study in populism and vital to understand as the continent struggles to formulate a geopolitical vision.
As a result of twenty years of economic intertwinement with Russia, Germany is at a comparative security deficit. The economic consequences of German support for Ukraine after their Fukayaman gamble of the past twenty years have been severe, especially for everyday Germans. Researchers at UMASS Amherst have found that “during the energy crisis, 2022 inflation rates rose dramatically and real wages dropped more than in any other year in post-war Germany”. It is no wonder that only 28% of Germans believe that Olaf Scholtz is doing well. The populism-inspiring effects of a shrinking economy have been combined with another issue: immigration. Not only is the German economy lagging but its welfare state props up its deficit of workers through immigration, furthering populist backlash. Indeed, 44% of Germans have limiting migration as their top goal, almost twice as much as climate change. It is no wonder this is fuel for the populist right and left wings, notably the infamous AfD and nouveau BSW.
In Germany, the AfD’s support for Russia comes from a stated desire for peace and economic benefits. Regarding peace, the AfD frequently uses the language of “de-escalation” in opposition to funding for Ukraine. The party’s website states, “For the AfD, a relaxation in relation to Russia is a prerequisite for a lasting peace in Europe. It is in Germany's interest to integrate Russia into an overall security policy structure, without neglecting its own interests and those of our allies.” Relaxation, de-escalation, and peace, however, are not synonyms. Russian victory would put an end to American hegemony on the continent; put Poland, Romania, and the Baltics in a more threatened position, and would reconstruct international expectations toward the legitimacy of war crimes and unconventional civilian and infrastructure targets. What motivates many Germans towards a view of the war as a question of escalation rather than one of maintaining and building enough security to secure lasting peace? Fear. After all, only 10% of Germans, according to the Allensbach Institute, predict a positive outcome for Ukraine in the war. Additionally, in eastern Germany, the geographic base of both the AfD and BSW, there lies more positive views of Russia and a greater sense of awe towards Europe’s bear.
This climate which breeds populism has not just accelerated the rise of the right, but has fractured and transformed the left. At the center of leftist populism is Sahra Wagenknecht and the party that bears her name. She split ten members from Die Linke, about 25% of the party, in September of 2023 over support for Ukraine. Since then the party has done impressively in state elections, reaping votes in low double digit percentages. Many wish to classify her in the same camp as the AfD but, while their policies may overlap somewhat, their values, voting bases, and intellectual genealogies are distant from the far-right. A major fear regarding the AfD is their excessive militarism, reminding some of Germany’s last far-right government from eight decades ago. BSW presents an opposite problem, as the west calls on Europe's powerhouse to pick up slack in fighting Russia, Wagenknecht has tried to cripple military might wherever possible. Her party has pushed to keep American missiles out of Germany and naval bases out of the Baltic. This makes sense when one comes across the shocking statistic that in eastern Germany, the home of support for BSW, “40% of the East German population believe that the USA is … one of the countries that pose a particularly great threat to peace. Conversely, 75 percent of the population consider Russia to be one of the countries that pose a particularly great threat to peace, but only 53 percent in East Germany,” according to a recent security report. It must also be rebuked that BSW inherits rightist thinking from AfD. Sahra Wagenknecht’s intellectual and political biography is impressively leftist. She was a prominent member of the most left wing faction of PDS, the party which succeeded the ruling party of East Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall. She has always been critical of other members of the left for not being sufficiently anti-capitalist and has called Marxism an “irreplaceable theoretical instrument to understand how our economy works.” She said in an interview with Russian media that Germany must "Get out of NATO". These are not views from the right or center. Finally, BSW does not draw from the same voters as the AfD, but rather leftists disaffected with insufficiently radical policies regarding pacifism and economic nationalization whom they take from the likes of Die Linke.
Populism is on the rise around the world. As more is needed from Germany to counteract Russia after years of naive policy, stroking fears and cratering the teutonic economy, stakes are high. While rightist populism is the norm in discussion, left wing populism comes with its own origins, notably former East Germany’s economic and geopolitical russophilia. A grasp of its origins and views is vital as the current traffic light coalition collapses. Will the reds and greens look left? In a broader context, a movement which is galvanized by opposition to neo-liberalism and American hegemony poses a threat to current world order. In a country with reserved politics such as Germany, it is hard to see this movement as a mere convulsion of politics. It must be wondered, will this be a trend across the West? If so, left wing populism, of which Sarha Wagenknecht is archetypal, might be one of the greatest threats to the liberal world order.
