Italy and Turkey in the Changing Mediterranean Order
By Luca Guerzoni
With both Italy and Turkey’s perception of the Mediterranean as a natural theater for their influence, their interactions have long shaped the history of the Mediterranean basin. After the first twenty years of the 20th century in which Italy and Turkey fought several wars over Libya and the Dodecanese islands, Italy and Turkey have begun consolidating their bilateral relations within the NATO alliance during the Cold War and later on in the prospectus of Turkey’s adhesion to the European Union. After the Cold War, the two countries adopted divergent foreign policies: Italy has struggled to implement a clear and continuous strategy, while Turkey used its Ottoman past to drive its foreign policy.
Since the end of the Cold War, Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean region has been disjointed and passive, as the country’s spheres of influence eroded: in the Balkans in 1990s, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and in Libya, and finally with the overthrowing of Colonel Muammar Gheddafi’s regime in 2011. The loss of Italian influence in these regions left a geopolitical gap that Turkey managed to fill, exploiting the reduced US interest in the Mediterranean to exercise its neo-Ottoman foreign policy. In fact, Turkey has rediscovered a remnant of its former imperial glory which became, under the AKP party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s driving foreign policy strategy. This pivotal change occurred in 2006 when a Turkish admiral, Cem Gurdeniz, developed the Mavi Vatan, also known as the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine. This geopolitical doctrine portrays a maritime vision to serve ambitious geopolitics, especially in former spheres of influence within the former Ottoman Empire.
As Turkey became increasingly assertive, Italy began a shift to a more defensive posture towards the Mediterranean, especially in the wake of the mass migration waves and Islamic terrorism following the Arab Spring in 2011. For instance, right-wing populist parties like La Lega began injecting among the Italian people the fear of terrorism and the danger of an imminent ‘invasion’. Several such parties’ narratives fueled the idea that Italy’s location in the Mediterranean was more of a curse, due to its exposure to migration routes, rather than an opportunity to capitalize on. As a result, in these years Italy implemented a more defensive posture to the Mediterranean, focusing on the patrol of sea waters and remaining passive while Turkey’s moved in on former Italian spheres of influence in Libya, the Aegean Sea and Albania. With its recently upgraded fleet, Turkey began asserting its claims over the Eastern Mediterranean after discovering large reservoirs of natural gas. This move challenged the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, in which Turkey had to give up all the Aegean Islands beyond the three nautical miles from the Turkish coasts, and soured relations with many of its neighbors – namely Cyprus, Egypt and Greece. Italy’s loss of influence and the ongoing civil war in Libya prompted Turkey to settle in Tripolitania, backing Libya’s Government of National Unity and training the Libyan army. All of this allowed Turkey to secure an agreement in 2018 with the puppet state it had supported in Western Libya to extend Turkey’s areas of maritime jurisdiction over Greek and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones. In response to this, Italy chose to side with Turkey in supporting Western Libya in the civil war and acquiesced to Turkey’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean without severing its ties with Greece and Cyprus.
The war in Ukraine and the vacuum of power left as the United States withdrew from the region to prioritize the Indo-Pacific left Italy free to engage more actively in the Mediterranean sea. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni seemed to take inspiration from Turkey’s foreign policy, seeking to boost Italy’s relations with North African countries like Tunisia and Algeria to gain control over migration routes and ensure consistent natural gas supply. Throughout the past three years, relations between Turkey and Italy became more amicable, culminating with Meloni’s invitation of Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to the G7 held in Italy in June 2024.
Decreasing American involvement in the Mediterranean Sea and the European Union’s focus on the war in Ukraine has facilitated cooperation between Italy and Turkey, which – despite their different approaches to foreign policy – share common interests in stabilizing Libya and playing a more active role in the security of the Mediterranean basin.
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