Geographic and Climatic Influences on the Battle of Waterloo
By Elek Krizsán
I. Introduction
The Battle of Waterloo, fought on June 18, 1815, was a pivotal moment in military history, and is often referenced as one of history’s most decisive battles. Following Napoleon’s dramatic return from exile, the campaign culminated in Napoleon’s equally dramatic defeat and his subsequent abdication. This paper will explore the impact terrain and weather had on the outcomes of this historic battle. By analyzing the interplay between geography and military science, this research seeks to provide new insight into the Battle of Waterloo. In this paper, I will investigate the geographical features of the battlefield at Waterloo, including how they influenced Napoleon and Wellington’s decisions both before and during the battle. Additionally, I will investigate how weather conditions on the day of the battle impacted the battle’s course. This paper will endeavor to answer the following questions: How did terrain and weather impact commanders’ tactical and operational decisions? How did strategic concerns influence how commanders responded to the battlefield’s geographic and climatic features?
While Napoleon had initially sued for peace, this was evidently not to be. Faced with a coalition rapidly assembling to oppose him, he weighed his options. With a weak army due to Louis XVIII’s abolition of conscription, Napoleon had to act quickly to discourage Russia and Austria, who were still in the process of mobilizing from continuing the campaign. Thus, the force ratios and massive mobilization against Napoleon pushed the French to begin the Waterloo Campaign. His only prospect for success was to launch a preemptive attack that would separate and defeat the already assembled British and Prussian forces. The hope was that the Russians and Austrians, seeing Napoleon’s decisive victory, would seek another resolution to the campaign, for fear of the campaign being arduous and taxing. Thus, the stage was set. In the days preceding the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon had defeated the Prussians at Ligny and the British at Quatre Bras, successfully separating the two armies and forcing them on the back foot. Napoleon split his army, sending Marshal Grouchy to pursue the Prussians while he pursued the British. However, the two allied armies managed to maintain communication, allowing the Prussians to ultimately come to Wellington’s aid and defeat Napoleon. Wellington, searching for a suitable location to make a stand against Napoleon, settled on Waterloo.
II. An Overview of the Battle
The Battle of Waterloo is typically divided into five phases.[1] Initiated by Napoleon, the battle opened with an assault on Hougoumont, which faltered, and continued throughout the day without a French success. The second phase was the assault of the Grand Battery and d’Erlon’s subsequent infantry attack on the British center, which saw another French failure to seize the initiative. The third phases consisted of yet another failed attack, this time by the French cavalry. The fourth stage saw the first French success: the capture of La Haye Sainte. However, French troops failed to capitalize on this victory, and British reinforcements prevented the French from breaking British lines. The arrival of the Prussians during this phase opened a new front for the French that drew the rest of its reserves. The last phase saw the glorious Imperial Guard attempt to make a last, potentially decisive, stand at Waterloo, but were ultimately routed, and led to the collapse of French forces.
The battlefield consisted of two low ridges opposing one another, with several buildings between them. The opposing armies positioned themselves on the two opposing ridges, and the buildings were used by the British as fortifications. The heavy rains of the night before the battle served to delay its commencement, as Napoleon wanted to wait for the ground to dry up before beginning his offensives. This had enormous consequences on the battle’s outcome, as the delay allowed time for Prussian forces to come to Wellington’s aid. Several buildings used as fortifications also influenced the battle, becoming strategic objectives that hindered French advance. Finally, distance had a significant impact on the battle, as Marshal Grouchy’s forces were too far from the battle to come to reinforce Napoleon in time. Wellington is often praised for his choice of terrain in the battle of Waterloo. He managed to turn the battle against Napoleon with a combination of expertly utilizing the terrain’s features and good fortune.
III. Landforms & Surface Structures
The key topographic features present in every analysis of Waterloo are the twin ridges facing each other that the two sides positioned themselves on. Wellington is repeatedly praised for his use of the reverse slopes of his ridge to protect and conceal his troops from French cannons.[2] This was part of Wellington’s care for and conservatism with his troops, quality he is often lauded for.[3] The French also concealed their cavalry advance behind one of their ridges.[4] On top of the relative height of Wellington’s ridge compared to that of Napoleon, the Wellington effectively capitalized on the battlefield’s terrain to minimize the effectiveness of French cannons.[5]
IV. Location
Despite the small size of the Waterloo battlefield, size and distance were crucial factors in deciding the battle’s outcome. Both Napoleon and Wellington counted on additional forces to support them in the conflict, with Napoleon relying on Grouchy to hold up the Prussians at Wavre, and Wellington relying on the Prussian Blücher to turn the tides against Napoleo[1] n. The location lent itself to communication issues between Napoleon and Grouchy[2] . Additionally, the distance between the Prussians and the battlefield left Wellington fighting alone for the first parts [3] of the battle. This could have been disastrous for the coalition had Napoleon not chosen to delay due to rain.
V. Weather and Climate
Due to the conditions created by the heavy rains of the night before, Napoleon was forced to delay his attack on Wellington’s forces. The rain had had a devastating effect on his army for a variety of reasons. The rain had led to copious amounts of mud covering the battlefield, which not only made cannons difficult to maneuver, but had scattered French forces, reduced cannons’ effectiveness, and sapped troops’ morale. The ground also lent Wellington an unexpected advantage by reducing the decisive capabilities of Napoleon’s greatest strengths[4] . The soft ground led to slow cavalry charges, minimizing the decisive impact cavalry could sometimes have in warfare of the era.[6] Mud, combined with tall, wet crops, made uphill assaults all the harder.[7] The mud additionally restricted the artillery’s mobility and effectiveness. Heavy guns became difficult to move through the thick mud[5] , and the ground at times absorbed cannonballs and mortar shot, dulling their impact, too, though they remained quite deadly.[8] Rather than bounce around wreaking havoc in enemy ranks, cannonballs were swallowed up by mud, while mortars often led to eruptions of dirt and little else. Hence to carry out his tactics, Napoleon needed the ground to firm up so that his cannons and cavalry could operate effectively.
Cannons were one of the greatest strengths of the French army, and were pivotal to Napoleon’s tactics.[9] In this campaign particularly, cannons had had an important role in Napoleon’s victories, and were even more important than usual.[10] A number of factors contributed to the diminishing of this decisive capability Napoleon relied on. A combination of luck and skillful preparation had placed Wellington in a position to take advantage of this reduction and defeat Napoleon decisively. Weather had prevented Napoleon from using cannons as effectively as he may have hoped, both in terms of mobility and the actual impact of cannonballs and shells. Wellington’s use of the reverse sloped on the ridges, as well as the ridges’ relative heights, had reduced the cannons’ impact on British troops.[11] Thus, despite the Grand Battery’s[6] extensive barrage, British troops were not destroyed to the extent that Napoleon had hoped for.[12] The French failure to capture La Haye Sainte, which would have greatly improved the cannons’ effectiveness, was significant.[13] Thus, the renowned and widely feared French artillery, though not crippled, did not have the decisive impact that had earned it such a formidable reputation.
Many of the battlefield’s many roads were also rendered unusable from the mud, which posed a challenge mainly to the French, as the British were content with remaining in their defensive position. The wet weather also reduced the effectiveness of troops’ weapons by increasing guns’ failure rate. Guns in wet weather misfired around one of every five to six attempts, as opposed to the one of nine that was typical of guns at the time.[14] This was due to guns’ springs not working properly.[15] In addition to this, his troops had scattered in their search for shelter during the night, and took longer than expected to assemble for battle. Wellington was happy to see Napoleon delay his attack, as every minute of delay meant that Prussian help would be more likely to arrive from Wavre in time to make a difference. The attack ultimately began at around 11 o’clock, far beyond Napoleon’s initial plan to begin his assault at first light.[16]
Meanwhile, the British also suffered the rain’s consequences. Many British troops did not sleep due to the rain and mud, and even more were wet throughout the early hours of the battle. One account reports soldiers resorting to smearing their blankets with mud to keep themselves warm during the night.[17] Additionally, they were robbed of proper sleep due to being on constant alert for an attack by the French.[18] At midnight, a false alarm woke many British forces from their sleep to await a nonexistent assault.[19] Thus the rain contributed to sleep deprivation for both sides of the battle of Waterloo. Both sides were also confronted by murky weather and smoke from incessant gunfire, the combination of which significantly reduced visibility, adding another layer of challenge to the battle.[20]
VI. Defenses
Due to the mobile nature of this conflict, with battles unfolding and armies pursuing each other, there was no time for the construction of any meaningful defensive infrastructure. The opposing armies rather relied on tactical and operational superiority over the enemy. The incorporation of terrain into the battle lay in the selection of a battlefield that could offer pre-existing defensive infrastructure to Wellington’s force.
Surface structures built in the area for civilian purposes were repurposed to aid Wellington’s defense. Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte both provided the British with strong defensive positions that would serve to disrupt any French frontal assault. Wellington took care to fortify his Western flank, capitalizing on Hougoumont to lend it some protection as well. Wellington wanted Napoleon could not attack Wellington’s Eastern flank either, as that would expose his forces to Prussian reinforcements.[21] Thus, he was forced to make a frontal attack, though eventually he did resort to an attack on the Eastern flank.[7] [8] This ultimately exposed him to Prussian reinforcements. Hougoumont was seen both by Wellington and posterity as a crucial point of the battlefield, and essential to defend.[22] This decision paid off, with a massive portion of the French army getting tied down in the attempt to take Hougoumont.[23] Despite the overwhelming force Napoleon deployed to Hougoumont, the British managed to hold the chateau throughout the battle. British preparations and tenacity had thus successfully guarded Hougoumont. Through defensive preparations such as making loopholes in walls to shoot at attacking soldiers from concealed positions, building shooting platforms, and stocking up on ammunition and equipment, the British more than adequately fortified Hougoumont, making it a significant obstacle for the French.[24] La Haye Sainte, on the other hand, was relatively neglected. Forces tasked with protecting the buildings at La Haye Sainte were insufficiently equipped to prepare the complex for defense.[25] They did not have enough ammunition, and had the significant difficulty of having burned the gate for warmth the night before.[26] Despite these setbacks, the defenders managed to hold out for most of the day, and aided in Wellington’s defense.[27] However, they ultimately succumbed, giving the French the first success of the day. The success of the British defense in holding the complex for as long as it did prevented the French from gaining access to its position and height. Earlier capture would have greatly aided French efforts to degrade British troops with a barrage of artillery, as Le Haye Saint was at perfect range of British lines for the French cannons.[28] Finally, the village of Smohain provided the British with a strong defensive position with its steep slopes, sunken lanes, and thick hedges.[29] Wellington capitalized on these features to help slow French attacks on the British flank.
VII. Cultural Factors
With European affairs incessantly reflecting ethnic conflicts and disagreements, it is interesting to note the cultural dynamics present on the battlefield at Waterloo. While the French force was homogenous, the allies’ forces were not. The British army was composed of many nationalities. Napoleon viewed the British army as inferior due to its composition, noting that over half the army was not British, and much of the British regiments were marked with inexperience.[30] Historians today agree with this assessment, describing the challenges ethnic composition posed for the British army. The Dutch and Belgians, due to lack of experience, were expected to perform poorly, and were thought to have hidden loyalties to Napoleon.[31] Wellington addressed this by dispersing them throughout his force to ensure they would not fail him at a critical point.[32] Indeed, Napoleon was counting on the inexperience and disloyalty of Dutch and Belgian troops to help his cause. His hopes held some merit, as Dutch troops did respond poorly to French assaults when compared to the British, but this clearly was not enough to tip the scales.[33] Language barriers are also highlighted as disrupting British cohesion, as British officers had difficulty communicating with their soldiers of other nationalities.[34] While the natural conclusion when presented with this information would be to assess the French as advantaged, evidently its homogeneity compared to the British lack of the same was not sufficient for French victory.
VIII. Conclusions
With the Battle of Waterloo being one of the most extensively studied battles in world history, many have commented on the mistakes Napoleon made. The division of his army was a catastrophic decision, as Grouchy’s forces at Wavre went unused, and additionally allowed Blücher to play a decisive role against Napoleon’s forces at Waterloo.[35] The personnel in leadership positions also contributed to Napoleon’s failure. Recently returned from exile, and forced to prepare for battle quickly, Napoleon did not have the same human capital to draw on as he had in previous campaigns.[36] The lack of awareness of the Prussian forces’ position — namely the expectation the Prussians would not make it in time — and misuse of his troops also contributed to the French defeat.[37] However, geography and climate must be considered in Napoleon’s defeat as well. The battle’s delay, which was to some extent forced on Napoleon, increased the likelihood that Wellington would win the day. Had Napoleon deployed his forces earlier, he may yet have had time to prevail. He was, however, disadvantaged in many other ways, and an earlier attack may not have been decisive. We can conclude that Wellington’s prudent choice of battlefield, and effective capitalization of geographic and climatic factors helped to tip the scales in his favor at the Battle of Waterloo.
[1] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (Penguin Group, 1978).
[2] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny (Little, Brown, 2014).
[3] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo (Random House, 2010).
[4] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[5] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[6] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[7] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[8] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
Jerry D. Morelock, “Battle of Waterloo – Summary, Analysis and Assessment for the 200th Anniversary,” Armchair General Magazine, June 5, 2015, http://armchairgeneral.com/battle-of-waterloo-summary-analysis-and-assessment-for-the-200th-anniversary.htm.
[9] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[10] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[11] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[12] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[13] Fred Kagan and Rocky Gay, “Analysis of the Battle of Waterloo and Napoleon’s Course of Action with the Janus Combat Modeling Simulation” (US Military Academy West Point, June 1, 1996), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA361076.pdf.
[14] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[15] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[16] “Waterloo 1815 | The Battle,” accessed December 10, 2023, https://library.brown.edu/cds/askb/waterloo/battle.html.
[17] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[18] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[19] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[20] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[21] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[22] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[23] Project Hougoumont, “Struggle for Hougoumont,” The Waterloo Association (blog), June 8, 2018, https://www.waterlooassociation.org.uk/2018/06/08/project-hougoumont/. ; Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[24] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.; Fred Kagan and Rocky Gay, “Analysis of the Battle of Waterloo and Napoleon’s Course of Action with the Janus Combat Modeling Simulation.”
[25] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.; Fred Kagan and Rocky Gay, “Analysis of the Battle of Waterloo and Napoleon’s Course of Action with the Janus Combat Modeling Simulation.”
[26] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[27] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[28] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
Fred Kagan and Rocky Gay, “Analysis of the Battle of Waterloo and Napoleon’s Course of Action with the Janus Combat Modeling Simulation.”
[29] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[30] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[31] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[32] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme.
[33] Jeremy Black, The Battle of Waterloo.
[34] “Surveying the Ground at the Battle of Waterloo,” Warfare History Network (blog), June 18, 2015, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/surveying-the-ground-at-the-battle-of-waterloo/.
[35] Smithsonian Magazine and Andrew Roberts, “Why We’d Be Better Off If Napoleon Never Lost at Waterloo,” Smithsonian Magazine, accessed December 10, 2023, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/we-better-off-napoleon-never-lost-waterloo-180955298/.
[36] Tim Clayton, Waterloo: Four Days That Changed Europe’s Destiny.
[37] Magazine and Roberts, “Why We’d Be Better Off If Napoleon Never Lost at Waterloo.”; “Surveying the Ground at the Battle of Waterloo.”
