Cultural Diplomacy and its Impacts for Arms Negotiations Between Russia and the United States
By Eva Mulholland
The relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States has reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The actions of autocratic leader Vladimir Putin and his war in Ukraine have poisoned the Russian-American relationship. Arms control treaties negotiated throughout and after the Cold War have been violated and abandoned by Russia. The United States must evaluate the future of its relations with Russia and develop a plan moving forward to reinstate arms control measures. Any interaction between Putin’s Russia and the United States will remain impossible. However, to discount the possibility of renegotiating weapons agreements with Russia would create a self-fulfilling prophecy of permanent tension and competition.
A Legacy of Mistrust
At the root of stagnant relations between the United States and Russia is an inherent lack of trust between the states on both sides. The fall of the Soviet Union did not rectify decades of mistrust between the U.S. and Russia. Within a decade of the collapse, Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and other Russian leaders attributed negotiations of German Reunification as the source for Russian mistrust for the US. Russian leaders claim the United States broke promises it made during the negotiations of German reunification. Russia claims President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker promised Mikhail Gorbachev and his counterparts that NATO would not expand eastward towards Russia and stay within its western boundaries. The validity of these claims are highly contested, and no formal agreement on the matter was ever signed. Regardless, this argument highlights mistrust from both parties. Russia claims the United States lied to and deceived Gorbachev to pursue its own power; The United States claims Russia is falsely accusing the U.S. of doing so to justify its war in Ukraine. Both claims tangibly display the absence of trust on both sides.
From their respective vantage points, the United States and Russia both have credible grounds to justify their lack of trust for the other. However, the moral equivalence of these claims should certainly be examined. Russia's withdrawal from the treaties such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), as well as the egregious violation of the Budapest Memorandum provide the United States with ample evidence to distrust Russia. It is important to note NATO expansion is the result of independent nations expressing their national aspirations to pursue the greater freedom and opportunity that comes with alignment with the United States and NATO. NATO countries did not coerce or invade these countries to force them into alignment. This contrasts Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and intimidation of countries such as Georgia and Moldova to impose its interests on these countries. The United States has attempted to cool tensions with Russia; Vladimir Putin has chosen to reject these offerings.
Hope for a productive relationship lies in rectifying deep mistrust between Russia and the United States. Unfortunately, attempts to do so must wait until the end of the Putin regime. In the meantime, the United States should develop a plan to promote mutual respect between Russia and the United States to cultivate an adversarial, yet cooperative relationship between the nations. Accepting that conflict permanently characterizes the Russian-American relationship creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that is not in the best interests of U.S. national security. In order to avoid this, the United States should identify diplomatic tactics that were effective during détente to employ in a post-Putin Russia. During a likely chaotic transfer of power, there will only be a short window of opportunity for the United States to initiate respect between both parties. Evaluating effective tactics of the past will increase the likelihood of building trust between Russia and the United States.
Personal Exchanges and Cultural Diplomacy During Détente
Improvements in the security relationship between the U.S.S.R and the United States during détente can be partially attributed to trust built through cultural diplomacy and other informal diplomatic efforts. Personal negotiations on low-stake agreements laid the groundwork for critical treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which were negotiated when American-Soviet relations were at a deadlock. The Interacademy Scientific Exchanges are an example of symmetrical, bilateral exchanges that had positive implications for communication between the United States and Soviet Union. These exchanges on developments in space technology and medicine were a part of Ambassador Jack F. Matlock’s efforts to increase people-to-people contact between Americans and Soviets. Amb. Meatlock believed these were key opportunities to foster mutual trust, understand each other's interests, and recognize intentions. This produced positive results when negotiating contentious, high-level agreements.
There is no reason to think this type of communication has lost its potency. That being said, communication with the Putin regime is currently impossible and highly unfavorable. However, the United States should not forget the impacts of in-person communication and should seek opportunities to pursue this in the future.
Cultural diplomacy was also an effective policy pursued during détente to promote understanding between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The U.S. policy of cultural diplomacy was defined in 1959 by the Department of State as, “the direct and enduring contact between people of different nations [. . .] to help create a better climate of international trust and understanding in which official relations can operate.” The National Security Council cited the goals of cultural diplomacy as deepening relations, building habits of cooperation, improving U.S. understanding of the U.S.S.R, and achieving long-term cooperation in culture, education, science and technology. The Soviets similarly sought cultural exchanges to learn more about the United States and promote the Soviet Union as a peaceful power seeking cooperation with the U.S. Both countries utilized the forums to treat each other equally, seeking reciprocity and mutual benefit.
Cold War cultural diplomacy was pursued through cultural exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union, which took many forms. The Graduate Student and Young Faculty Exchange allowed graduate students from both countries to foster understanding for the opposite state through academic experience. Cultural exhibitions took place in both countries for citizens to observe developments in architecture, technology for the home, and outdoor recreation. The most impactful and visible cultural exchanges took place in the area of the arts. The Soviet Union sent dance groups, orchestras, operas, and ice shows to the United States for everyday individuals to experience Soviet culture. The Moiseyev Folk Dance Ensemble and Bolshoi and Kirov Ballets were particularly well received by the American public. The United States focused their cultural exports around music, with jazz and rock music symbolically associated with the fall of the Berlin wall.
Cultural Diplomacy for the Modern
It is important to resist viewing cultural exchanges with rose colored glasses. Cultural diplomacy is imperfect, fickle, and subject to criticism. American Cultural exhibitions in Moscow were met with Soviet accusations of propaganda, highlighting how mistrust bled into efforts to dispel it. However, the key goal of fostering mutual understanding to promote cooperation was still achieved by engaging in cultural diplomacy. Such efforts should be reevaluated and reimagined after the end of the Ruso-Ukrainian war. The intent of both countries' engagement in trust-building activities should also be evaluated, and the United States should certainly maintain reasonable skepticism of Russia until proven otherwise.
It is important that modernized cultural diplomatic efforts be coupled with strong economic pressure in order for the US to gain the leverage to bring Russia to the negotiating table. Such was the strategy surrounding the negotiations of the INF. The INF was negotiated at the height of tensions during the Cold War, but also during the height of cultural diplomacy efforts. Such a correlation suggests that mutual understanding and respect of culture translates to positive outcomes in arms negotiations. The combination of economic pressure and cultural diplomacy would also be an alternative to driving Russia to negotiate via the threat of force.
Not all Soviet-era cultural efforts would be suitable in a modern, fragile context in which Russia has committed unforgivable acts. The Russian-American relationship would be far too delicate to reinstate cultural exhibitions and pervasive autocratic institutions would likely limit the American music and arts that could be observed by Russian audiences. However, the exchange of students would be an agreeable, mutually beneficial way to reinstate person-to-person contact between Russian and American citizens. Students are impressionable and curious, seeking to understand the world around them. Immersive education allows for foreign students to gain a high level of cultural understanding, which inherently fosters trust. Even with questionable intent from the Russian side, accepting Russian students in the American educational settings would be the best route to reinstate open communication between Russia and the United States.
Managing Expectations
Russia and the United States will certainly never be allies. The United States will never be able to fully trust Russia, and rightfully so. Putin’s Russia has proven time and time again that it is not to be relied on. Putin’s distrust of the west, on the other hand, is like a thief who laments that he can’t trust his victims’ doors will be left unlocked. The environment of mistrust has been cultivated by Vladimir Putin, and therefore the U.S. must unfortunately wait out the Putin regime before attempting to engage with Russia in a productive way. Even after Putin is gone, the Russian threat to U.S. security does not simply disappear. Cultural diplomacy may not be able to undo decades of distrust between the U.S. and Russia, but this does not mean the United States should fail to engage in efforts to mitigate the threat posed by the Russian government.
The world is always safer when arms treaties such as the former INF and New START treaties are in place and respected. These agreements can not be reached when there is no communication between both parties.
It is important to note that trust-building activities are still far off in the future. The war in Ukraine continues to grind on and Vladimir Putin should never be seen as a fair negotiator. However, the United States should consider how to establish a relationship characterized by adversarial cooperation with Russia in the decades that follow Putin’s demise and the end of the war in Ukraine. It is important that the United States fosters mutual respect to ensure Russia respects the sanctity of arms control treaties enough to uphold them. Doing so will improve the security of both nations, thus mitigating and preventing conflict. Ultimately, there must be engagement based on mutual respect and dialogue in the future.
Interpersonal communication remains the best way to foster respect. The United States should not forget the positive impacts face-to-face contact with Russia has had in the past. The road to mutual respect between the United States and Russia is long, and the outcome may only be limited at best. Still, a plan to foster mutual respect between the United States and Russia with the aim of reinstating arms control treaties can help minimize the volatility of the Russian-American relationship and pave the way for a more secure relationship, however far in the future it may be.
