The Frozen Fight for The Pindus: The Effect of Physical and Cultural Geography on the Italian Invasion of Greece 1940-1941
By Charlie Poulos
Introduction
Few countries can claim to celebrate being invaded by a foreign power, yet every 28th of October, Greece celebrates, “Oxi Day” marking Italy’s 1940 invasion. This is due to the Greeks’ resounding and unexpected victory against a seemingly superior foe. The Greco-Italian war is often viewed in a heavily nationalistic light among Greeks today. However, I will argue that their victory was less a point of the outright superiority of Greek troops but largely the consequence of geographical factors and leadership. By applying the concepts of spatiality, Friction, and Centers of Gravity at the tactical and strategic levels, I will show that Greece’s victory can therefore be attributed to their greater adaptability to cultural and geographic conditions.
Oxi Day: the Prelude to War
On the grounds of perceived false Greek neutrality, the Italian submarine, Delfino, sank the celebrated pride of the Greek fleet, Elli, on August 15th, 1940 while docked at Tinos during Orthodox Christian holiday celebrations. Fueled by religious fervor, Greek nationalistic unity grew against the Italians, while warning the Greek government to prepare for an Italian invasion. On the morning of October 28, 1940, Italian Ambassador Emanuele Grazzi handed an ultimatum to Greek Premier Ioannis Metaxas, giving him three hours to allow Italy free passage and occupation of unspecified strategic points in Greece or face invasion. His response was the line “Alors, c’est la guerre,” (So it means war); though it was popularly recounted as being the single Greek word “Oxi,” (No), marking the start of the Greco-Italian War.
The Italian Offensive (October 28th to November 13th 1940)
Despite being outnumbered, Greece’s use of terrain and local morale proved decisive in repelling the Italian invasion. The front was bisected by the Pindus mountains into two theaters. In the West lay the Epirote theater, where the Italians sought to take the port-town of Igoumenitsa to relieve logistical issues. In the Eastern, West Macedonian Theater, the Italians looked to capture the town of Metsovo, to split Greece’s forces in two. In Epirus, General Charalambos Katsimitros constructed a defensive position alongside the Elaia and Kalamas rivers, selected for its swampy river banks, halting Italian armored divisions and bogging down infantry. Furthermore, the Italian invasion occurred during an irregularly cold fall and winter. The first several weeks were marked by icy rain, rendering the battlefield a muddy quagmire, further hindering Italy’s advance. Despite coastal Italian motorized divisions’ progress towards Igoumenitsa, poor roads and mud halted continuation. Along the river, elevated Greek artillery positions were able to defeat the bogged down Italian armor and infantry—easy targets for Katsimitros. As Italian advances into Epirus halted, the Greeks were able to mount a counteroffensive.
The Battle of the Pindus to the East proved the more critical threat. Before the Italian invasion, Greece feared a joint Italian-Bulgarian invasion, leaving many divisions in the East, while the nation itself was not fully mobilized upon the 28th of October. Thus, a frontline total of 30,000 previously deployed troops would need to hold off the 70,000 strong Italian force, mostly concentrated in the Pindus until reinforcements from the Bulgarian border and the ten-day reservist mobilization could be transferred to the front. The Italians, viewing the greater strategic importance of the East, assigned the elite Julia Mountain Division to penetrate the Greek lines towards Metsovo. The division rapidly progressed despite rugged conditions, forcing a Greek retreat. After pushing 25 miles into Greek territory through valley passes, the Greeks, with artillery along the surrounding ridge lines, shelled the division with a high-ground advantage on three sides. Meanwhile, Greek cavalry were sent to take mountain passes to the Italians’ rear, cutting off supply and forming an encirclement. The Italians suffered immense losses as they were forced to break out of the encirclement, retreating to their original staging point in Koritsa, Albania. The decisive Greek victories at the Battles of the Pindus and Elaia-Kalamas routed the Italian offensive back to their original, October 28th positions by November 13th—just two weeks into the invasion.
The Greek Counteroffensive (November 14th 1940 to January 6th 1941)
With stabilized fronts, the Greeks prepared a counteroffensive into Albania to force Italy out of the Balkans before a potential German-Bulgarian Spring invasion. Under Field Marshall Alexandros Papagos, the now fully mobilized army was split into three offensive army groups: the Epirote “Group A” in the West, the Pindus “Group B” in the Center, and the West Macedonian “Group C” in the East. Papagos sought to defeat the Italians at the city of Koritsa in the East, a significant cultural city for the Greeks, and a major Italian logistical hub. Army Group B would push toward the vital North-South Klissoura pass in the Center after taking Argyrokastro, and the Western Group A would push towards the port of Valona on the coast, linking West and Center.
The Battle of Morava-Ivan, looking to capture Koritsa, illustrated the first of many Greek offensive victories through leveraging geography. Koritsa lay on a plateau, surrounded by two mountain ridges to its East and West flanks. The Greeks held no anti-tank capabilities to combat the Italian armour groups which lay in the central Devoll river valley and paved Cangonj pass. Thus, they sought to envelop Italy’s armored and infantry forces to enter Koritsa from behind, encircling them by moving along the ridge lines. The sudden Greek advance against the now-exhausted Italian troops took them by surprise. Swift moves allowed the Greeks to secure the Cangonj pass, simultaneously severing the Italian-held Devoll and Morava valleys and all communication and supply lines to Koritsa, enabling the Greeks to capture the city by November 23rd. Avoiding Italian troops along the ridges and leveraging the mountainous geography were critical in maintaining an advantage by controlling elevated terrain to shell the Italians within the valley, preventing any cohesive defense. The victory at Morava-Ivan forced the Italians Northward into a poor defensive position as the Koritsa plateau gave the Greeks access to the Albanian interior lowlands North of the city; a strategic staging point for further advance.The Greek capture of Koritsa served as the first major Allied victory of World War II, winning the country an immense morale boost and needed British material support. Furthermore, prior to the Greek invasion, Italy issued a partial demobilization, allowing Italian troops to return for the Fall harvest. Yet, seeing the Greeks’ successful offensive, Mussolini was forced to rescind the order. The remobilization, however, would take time. To bolster Italy’s defense, they redeployed North African troops to the Greek front, but the desert-acclimated soldiers were not used to fighting in the snowy and mountainous conditions of the Pindus. Following the capture of Koritsa, the extreme cold and snowy conditions had an immense effect on both armies. The Greeks successfully continued their offensive across the front seen at Himara, Argyrokastro, and Pogradec; however, by late December, the harsh winter conditions forced all large-scale offenses to be temporarily suspended. Severe frostbite began inflicting heavy casualties to both sides in and out of combat, accounting for most of the casualties suffered during the Greco-Italian war. The winter of 1940-1941 had been the coldest in the Balkans for 50 years, inflicting arctic level conditions; consequently, the influence of mud, snow, and freezing temperatures cannot be overstated. The cold was the greatest killer of pack animals, commonly falling dead along mountain paths; the weather killed the morale of Greek and Italian soldiers alike with stories of men freezing to death or dying by falling snowy debris all being commonplace. Moreover, as mud and snow made logistics routes slow and often impassable, it meant ammunition, clothing, rations, and other equipment stockpiles were often near gone; with most Greek and Italian soldiers needing to rely on just a fifth the standard daily food ration. The Italians further lacked any field hospital capabilities due to weather and port limitations, guaranteeing death for any case of frostbite. Nevertheless, Italy’s defensive position began to comparatively improve by January, including bettering logistic capabilities and troop amassment further complicated the poorly supplied and overstretched Greeks.
Greco-Italian Stalemate (January 6th to April 6th 1941) and the German Entry
Fear of a German-Bulgarian invasion haunted the Greek general Staff, notably Papagos. For him, the Greeks needed to defeat the Italians at the port of Valona before a German invasion to shore up sufficient manpower for the “Metaxas [defense] Line” near the Bulgarian border. However, it was imperative to Metaxas that their communications and logistics be consolidated as Greek supplies dwindled. The final major Greek offensive victory occurred at the strategic Klissoura Pass, a river-valley bounded by Mt. Trebessina and a supply road. The pass served as a key logistical pathway connecting the Pindus mountains to the Albanian lowlands approaching Valona—one of Italy's two critical ports. The frostbitten and undersupplied remnants of the Julia division were stationed atop Mt. Trebessina, allowing the Greeks to take the Mountain without severe resistance. Its relief force, the newly conscripted “Wolves of Tuscany” Division was left to march through the snow for a day without reconnaissance, topographical maps, animal or motorized transport, artillery, or communications equipment as a desperate effort to keep the Julia fighting. Yet, ill-equipped, both divisions faced devastation.
The humiliating defeat reached Mussolini, prompting another month of combat over Klissoura, using armor and infantry assaults. The Italian onslaught was costly for both sides amidst the severe snow and constant combat. But with the Greek’s holding superior positioning and artillery emplacements overlooking the valley and supply road, they persisted. The Greek capture and subsequent Greco-Italian stalemate over Klissoura marked the end of Greece’s counteroffensive into Albania. The Greeks were forced to redirect troops to the Bulgarian border while frostbite and ammunition shortages prevented progress. Mussolini wished to save face with Germany, the Allies, and the Italian people over the nation’s military competence before the Germans could invade Greece. Thus, he personally came to Albania in March of 1941 ahead of a wide scale “Spring Offensive” to retake Epirus.
Of the total 25 Italian divisions in Albania, Italy amassed 9 infantry and armored divisions North of Klissoura-Trebessina. The morning of March 9th, 1941, these divisions attacked Greek positions at Trebessina striving to penetrate the Greek line to push towards Ioannina; the Greek Staff HQ and capital of Epirus. With advanced knowledge of the attack, the Greeks prepared forward defenses, cutting Italian phone-lines, installing machine gun nests and artillery batteries, and digging defensive trenches in the hills and mined anti-tank ditches at their bases. The attack began with intensive aerial bombing sorties and an artillery bombardment of
100,000 shells. Amidst rain and dense fog, the Italians began large scale infantry assaults across the snow-covered landscape. Fog and rain remained an important aspect of the battle. The snow and rain slowed the Italians’ advance. While fog played an indispensable role affecting the constant frontal assaults of Italian troops. Greek soldiers waited in fog-covered trenches as the Italians, softened by defending artillery, would be met with bayonets, grenades, or rifle fire. While the fog hid the Greeks’ artillery, situated in the valleys behind the strategic hillscapes, from Italian bombers. Compared to the Italian failure at Caporetto, the week-long Spring Offensive resulted in a bloody defeat, with official reported casualties being 12,000 and 5,000 for the Italians and Greeks respectively. The offensive’s failure led to the suspension of Italian offenses against Greece until the German invasion in April and marked Italy’s functional subordination to Hitler.
Further Analysis
As will become apparent, the Greeks’ resounding victories can be viewed through spatiality and the Clausewitizian lenses of Friction and Centers of Gravity. Initially, the only true outright advantage Italy had over Greece was through possessing tanks and air superiority. However, the Greeks were able to bypass this discrepancy through their better application of spatiality. Exploiting components of physical, socio-cultural, and political dynamics based on situational needs, maximized Greece’s effectiveness in state, unity, and combat. The Italians consistently underestimated Greece’s capabilities, believing socio-political divisions and apathy would win Mussolini an easy victory. This was largely a product of their corrupt, disjointed, and self-motivated military culture, which hindered cohesion and adaptability, relying on hubristic ideals. Most Italian military staff were more worried about their political standing and interbranch competition than with competence, a point underlined by the Italian cultural code of silence to authority known as “Omerta” The Italian Staff officers refused to read their Military Attache’s intelligence report directly stating Greece’s true capabilities, while outdated doctrine and officer neglect led to an over dependence on non-innovative frontal assaults and a sharp disconnect between officers and rank and file soldiers.
Conversely, the Greeks’ were not afforded the chance to win out of numerical superiority but through leveraging their environment. Italy’s World War I-esque frontal assault doctrine differed greatly from Greece’s common use of elastic defense, regularly inflicting envelopments and cutting off Italian logistic trains based in valleys. Both Albania and Greece lacked sufficient infrastructure. However, Italy, dependent on their two inadequate ports of Valona and Durazzo, clearly illustrated the country’s logistics as its center of gravity. For Greece, the capture of key logistics points would cripple the Italian war machine. Italy further lacked any local support, dependending on their motorized transport—often bogged down due to impassable terrain—and lower population of pack animals severely crippled by the brutal winter. Though still inadequate, Greece’s logistics train was shorter, possessed over 3 times the number of pack animals, and was helped immensely throughout the war by the local populace carrying ammunition through mountain trails. In support of the Greek cause, local Epirote women both in Greece and the heavily Greek-populated region of Northern Epirus formed supply caravans, carrying equipment on foot to the front; a practice which served a crucial lifeline throughout the war.
While Italy’s key center of gravity, and thus target, lay in their logistics, Greece’s lay in their morale. Italy depended on inefficient doctrines propped up by an inept officer-culture and worsened by poor weather. Greece saw the defense of the homeland against Italy as a point of national unity achieving the complete support of every aspect of the state. The Greeks maintained morale despite crippling weather conditions as a byproduct of nationalistic unity, exemplified following the capture of the heavily Greek populated city of Koritsa.
Conclusion
Established above, Italy’s ability to wage war was dependent on the will of their high-command, itself based on their logistics train and saving face to authority. Conversely, Greece’s lay in the will of their people as a whole, and the longevity of their ammunition stockpiles. The Greeks’ suffered from the same weather conditions as the Italians. But their superior application of spatiality and correct understanding of Italy’s center of gravity decided the course of the war: achieved by maximizing friction. Greece’s primary strategic objective was to take Valona, an achievement which would end any chance of Italy holding a Greek conquest of Albania. Though unfulfilled, Greece constantly set strategic and tactical objectives on Italian logistical paths. Beyond logistics, the use of fog and anti-tank ditches during the Spring offensive, mud at Elaia-Kalamas, and winter weather at Morava-Ivan and Klissoura pass all looked to sow confusion and hinder cohesion amongst the Italian ranks. Approaching the Greco-Italian war’s outcome as a case of one side’s inherent superiority or inferiority, like any conflict, is a false and reductionist viewpoint. Simply put, this paper’s application of spatiality, and clausewitzian concepts proves that the Greeks’ superior utilization of their physical and socio-cultural environment helped them maintain the initiative throughout the entirety of the Greco-Italian War, ultimately serving the primary reason for their victory.
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