Reviving an Old Vision, Toward a European Defense Force for EU Autonomy

By Lara Gila

Target Actor and Context

In recent years, Europe has been confronted to a surrounding increasingly unstable geopolitical context. If the topic of a European Defense Force has been present in the background of European political debates for decades, the multiplication of external threats to security have made the need for an autonomous defense framework more urgent.

Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as a consequence of the country’s desire to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the rise in terrorist threats in the EU’s southern and eastern neighborhoods (EEAS, 2022; NATO, 2023), have made it clear that the EU cannot exclusively rely on NATO for its military protection.

In this context, it is in the European interest to make steps forward in the process of building a unified European Army under the framework of the European Union, which would emancipate the European defense from external entities and would make the EU reacquire an important role at a global level.

This advising is directed to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) as it is in his role to guide the security policies in the Union. As head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the HR/VP steers the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), aligning Member States' priorities and fostering defense integration. It is in his function to address fragmentation in military capabilities, over-reliance on non-European suppliers, and the complexity of multinational operations. Leveraging the EEAS’s diplomatic networks, the HR/VP can build international support and align defense efforts with broader EU foreign policy goals (Council of the EU, 2023). Advocating for a European Defense Force would enhance the EU’s autonomy, improve operational coherence, and strengthen its ability to address cross-border threats like cyberattacks and terrorism, reinforcing Europe’s strategic global standing.

Key Issue and Problem

The EU lacks an integrated defense structure, leaving Member States dependent on national forces, often poorly coordinated across borders, whereas issues concerning the EU as a whole necessitate support of NATO. Newly re-elected United States’ President Trump stated during his electoral campaign that he encourages Russia to ‘do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO member state that does not meet spending guidelines on defense, which is supposed to represent at least 2% of each country’s GDP, implying that the U.S. would take a step back from the collective-defense clause at the heart of the alliance (art. 5). Eight members of NATO have not reached the target in 2024, namely Croatia (1.81%), Portugal (1.55%), Italy (1.49%) Canada (1.37%), Belgium (1.30%), Luxembourg (1.29%), Slovenia (1.29%) and Spain (1.28%). Seven of them are members of the European Union.

In case of an actual retreat of support from the United States, which is the most militarily powerful member state of NATO, the EU cannot respond autonomously to any crises without a European Defense Force. Although the European investment in defense has increased of 11% in 2024, the lack of coordination limits efficient translation of expenses into practical results. This lack of capacity threatens the EU’s credibility as a strategic actor and increases dependency on non-EU powers, ultimately jeopardizing EU security interests.

Anticipated Challenges and Mitigation

The implementation of a European Defense Force would face several challenges, both internally and externally. At an internal level, EU member states have different perceptions of foreign threats, leading to a phenomenon called “strategic cacophony”, which implies that concerns for national sovereignty overshadow potential cooperation benefits (Meijer & Brooks, 2023). The deployment of a European Military Force entails unresolved issues about where it would operate - on the Russian border to deter aggression, in North Africa to counter terrorism and migration, or globally in peacekeeping roles. Diverging national interests among member states complicates consensus, as each state focuses on their regional priority (European Defence Agency, 2022; EUISS, 2023). An additional obstacle arises from the fragmentation in provision of equipment, which strongly relies on individual purchases from the United States, as demonstrated by the supply sent by Ukraine, 78% of which has been acquired from external sources (European Defense Agency Report, 2022). This, combined to the misaligned defense planning cycles and questioning around command in multinational operations, prove the complexity of military integration (Valasek, 2011).

The EU must enhance its defense industrial and technological base (DITB). First, the EU must foster a unified strategic culture through the Strategic Compass initiative, which aligns member states on common security threats and provides a roadmap for joint defense priorities. Addressing equipment fragmentation, the EU should promote joint procurement initiatives through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and incentivize collaboration within the European Defense Industry to reduce dependency on non-European suppliers, thereby enhancing interoperability and self-reliance. In this process, it is essential to create a Common Market (Letta, 2024). Synchronizing defense planning cycles via the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) can further streamline collaboration, helping member states align capabilities and budgets. Additionally, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework offers a way to standardize command structures for multinational operations, establishing clear protocols and shared command responsibilities.

External challenges arise from the reticence of NATO and the U.S. to the building of a potential concurrent in the leadership of defense strategy. U.S. officials fear that too much European independence in defense could dilute NATO’s unity, as seen in their mixed reactions to EU initiatives like PESCO and the European Defense Fund, which NATO leaders caution should complement rather than replace NATO structures (European Defense Agency Report, 2022).

Implications

A cooperative approach between the two defense institutions would strengthen, rather than diminish, NATO’s role.In this cooperative model, NATO would retain its leadership in direct military action and crisis response due to its command structures, military assets, and collective defense mandate. The EU, meanwhile, could enhance security through non-military means, such as economic sanctioning, diplomatic engagement, and post-conflict stabilization. With an autonomous European defense force, the EU would be able to handle certain regional crises independently, without needing NATO’s resources. This could allow NATO to concentrate on broader or higher-intensity threats, making both organizations stronger and more effective. Ultimately, an empowered European army would lead to a more balanced and equitable transatlantic partnership, where the EU and the U.S. could collaborate on more equal footing.

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