A "GNU" Era of Governance: The 2024 South African Elections
Written by James Croll; Edited by Andrew Ma
Published on November 22nd, 2024
Introduction
On May 29th, 2024, nearly 16 million South Africans went to the polls and cast their votes in the general election. The results were clear: for the first time in nearly thirty years, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its majority in the National Assembly. With the nation and party facing mounting challenges, including economic hardship, a severe energy crisis, and waning public trust, the ANC was forced to confront a hard reality: it would now have to form a coalition government to remain in power. This election not only reflected deep-seated frustration with the ANC’s governance over the past three decades, but also demonstrated a rising demand for accountability and broader representation in the South African federal government. The Democratic Alliance, the major opposition party since the years of Mandela’s presidency in the 1990s, joined their political rivals in the nation’s first Government of National Unity (GNU). The electoral outcome marks a critical shift in South African politics, compelling the coalition government to bridge their differing ideologies to address ineffective policies or risk a serious political crisis if they fail to maintain their partnership and the GNU collapses.
The governmental structure of South Africa is unique, as the parliamentary legislature in the National Assembly directly elects the President (who serves as head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief) by majority vote in a similar process to the election of a Prime Minister in other nations. Since the abolition of Apartheid in 1994, the African National Congress has had thirty years of an uninterrupted majority in the National Assembly, with civil-rights and anti-Apartheid activist Nelson Mandela serving as the first President through most of the 1990s. After Mandela came Thabo Mbeki, his handpicked successor and another ANC anti-Apartheid advocate in the years leading up to the abolition of the practice. Mbeki served almost two full terms before being ousted by the leadership of the ANC due to allegations of improper interference in the state prosecution of Jacob Zuma, his deputy president who was charged with corruption in a highly publicized trial in 2006. Zuma led his ousting at the 2007 ANC elective conference, which gave him the political momentum to run a successful electoral campaign for president in 2009.
While Mbeki represented the neoliberal moderate wing of the ANC, Zuma was an avowed leftist and populist, proposing major structural and political reform through land expropriation without compensation and maneuvering South Africa closer to Russia and China through their membership into BRICS. Zuma served from 2009 to 2018, when he resigned due to the threat of a no-confidence vote by the National Assembly over corruption allegations. He was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa, his deputy president who has served from 2018 to the present day.
Former President Jacob Zuma and Ramaphosa (as his Deputy President) in 2015
Credit: Government of South Africa
Cyril Ramaphosa’s Presidency
Ramaphosa rose to prominence as Secretary-General of South Africa’s largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers. He was the ANC’s chief negotiator during the negotiations that ended Apartheid, and many South Africans who believed Ramaphosa would be Mandela’s successor were surprised when he left politics in 1996 to become a very successful businessman. Ramaphosa returned to politics in 2012, serving as deputy president under Jacob Zuma until he was elected in his own right to the presidency in 2018. Ramaphosa has dealt with a number of problems facing South Africa during his tenure, including the COVID-19 pandemic and massive economic strife. Notably, South Africa has the worst percentage of unemployment in the world at 32% (with that number increasing to 59% for South Africans between 15 and 24), and is the country with the highest wealth inequality in Africa. During his term, South Africans were also dealing with an energy crisis dubbed "load-shedding," characterized by frequent nationwide electricity blackouts stemming from mismanagement within the state-owned power utility, Eskom. The ANC’s reputation has also been tarnished by corruption in leadership, particularly under Zuma’s leadership in the 2010s. ANC leaders engaged in rampant graft of public resources and funds, resulting in losses of billions of dollars and public trust in leadership.
In the face of these challenges and more, Ramaphosa has tried to rebuild public trust in the party but has been mostly unsuccessful. Over 75% of South Africans believe that the ANC has failed to significantly improve the lives of millions of poor Black South Africans during its thirty-year tenure. With the ANC’s vote share steadily decreasing over the past decades, many analysts correctly predicted that the party would not receive a majority of the vote for the first time in the country’s history, forcing them to enter a coalition government with other parties that are largely united in their opposition to the government’s rule.
Other Major Political Parties
The leaders of the parties within the Multi-Party Charter
Credit: BizNews
The second largest party before the election was the centrist Democratic Alliance, led by John Steenhuisen. The party enjoys its greatest support in the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces among white voters and has been in the opposition for the past few decades (since the dissolution of the pro-Apartheid National Party in 1997). The DA is the founding member of the Multi-Party Charter (MPC), a coalition consisting of Steenhuisen’s party and several smaller center-right conservative parties united in opposition to the ANC.
The other two major parties, the MK and the EFF, are both splinter parties of the ANC. The third largest party in parliament, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is led by radical firebrand Julius Malema, a former ANC youth leader who advocates for radical policy including the expropriation of white-owned land and the nationalization of industry. MK is led by former President Jacob Zuma, who in late 2023 announced his departure from the ANC, accusing the party and Ramaphosa of being "proxy for white monopoly capital" and labeling the ANC as "sellouts" and "apartheid collaborators." He declared the formation of his political party, uMkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), a populist and Zulu nationalist named after the ANC's historical military wing. In March 2024, the Electoral Commission barred Zuma from running in the election due to a criminal conviction, but an appeal led the Electoral Court to allow him to stand. However, on May 20th, the Constitutional Court ruled him ineligible to serve as President, though he was still able to campaign for his party with his name remaining on the ballot as party leader.
The 2024 Election
South Africans wait in line on Election Day
Credit: Reuters
The electoral process has undergone significant changes since the 2019 cycle, following President Ramaphosa's signing of the South African Electoral Amendment Bill into law in April 2023. This bill restructured the nation’s National Assembly, with one-half (200 members) elected directly from each province through proportional representation and the other half elected from a national list contested by political parties.
The election, which took place on May 29th, 2024, had the lowest turnout (58.64%) since free and fair elections began at the end of Apartheid nearly three decades ago. As expected, the African National Congress received below 50% for the first time, earning only 40.18% of the vote and winning 159 seats. This disappointing performance lost the ANC 71 seats in the National Assembly, ensuring they would need to form a coalition government to keep power. That being said, the party still enjoyed overwhelming support in the provinces of Eastern Cape and Limpopo, in addition to narrowly winning the provinces of Free State, North West, and Mpumalanga. The Democratic Alliance under Steenhuisen experienced a small increase in support, earning 21.81% of the vote (around a 1% improvement on their 2019 results) and gaining 3 seats, but more importantly, managed to maintain its status as the second-largest party in the nation. Additionally, as the leader of Steenhuisen’s Multi-Party Charter coalition, the DA enjoyed an alliance with a few smaller parties (with around 10-20 seats in Parliament altogether) that ultimately became nationally relevant post-election.
One of the major shifts in the election was the province of KwaZulu-Natal, previously an ANC stronghold (they received around 54% in 2019) that only gave 15% of its votes to the incumbent party. This is largely the result of the very strong performance of former President Jacob Zuma’s MK in the province, earning 44.9% of the vote. In the rest of the country, Zuma’s party had a relatively minor impact; however, its strong support in the majority Zulu and high-poverty KwaZulu-Natal and other neighboring provinces propelled MK into third place with 14.58% of the vote, securing 58 seats in the National Assembly. His party’s regional supremacy in eastern South Africa (alongside the other regional party, the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party) directly cost the ANC almost 30 seats, almost singlehandedly wiping out their parliamentary majority due to the tension between Zuma and his successor, current President Ramaphosa. The other major party, the far-left Economic Freedom Fighters party (yet another splinter of the ANC) led by firebrand Julius Malema, slightly underperformed expectations by only earning 9.52% of the vote and lost 5 seats in the National Assembly.
Credit: Wikimedia Foundation, with data from various official South African sources.
Because the ANC no longer had an outright majority in the National Assembly, Ramaphosa and his party were forced to seek a coalition government between some configurations of the other major parties. After weeks of debate and discussion between the ANC, the DA and MPC, and other parties, an ANC spokesperson announced that the party was interested in creating a “national unity government” and invited the other major parties to join. Responses were mixed. Zuma's uMkhonto we Sizwe expressed reluctance to join the coalition due to ongoing tensions between the two leaders. "We are willing to negotiate with the ANC, but not the ANC of Cyril Ramaphosa," stated MK Party spokesperson Nhlamulo Ndlela shortly after. Both the DA and the EFF were contenders for entering the ANC’s coalition, but following MK’s withdrawal, it became evident that Ramaphosa would need to ally with the DA to secure a majority of seats. The EFF opted not to join the ruling coalition, with Julius Malema condemning the DA as a “racist party.” In turn, the DA argued that any coalition with the EFF, whose agenda includes the nationalization and reappropriation of mines, banks, and land, would be a deal-breaker. On June 14th, the Government of National Unity (GNU) coalition was formally created with a statement of intent, consisting of ANC, DA (alongside its MPC member parties including the IFP), and a few smaller parties.
Under this agreement, Ramaphosa would remain President, while Thoko Didiza of the ANC would be elected as Speaker. However, Annelie Lotriet from the DA would serve as the coalition’s candidate for Deputy Speaker, marking the first time since 1996 that a non-ANC member held this position. According to the agreement, decisions in the unity government will have to reach “sufficient consensus,” meaning it earns the support of 60 percent of the parties in the agreement. This means that the ANC will not be able to make decisions unilaterally. Additionally, if the ANC and IFP agree on a policy change but the DA dissents, a decision could pass, but if the DA and IFP both disagree, the ANC cannot act alone. The DA requested ten cabinet positions, including key ministries like Health and Communication alongside the deputy presidency for John Steenhuisen, but the ANC countered with an offer of only five positions, leading to considerable frustration from their coalition partner. On June 30, President Ramaphosa announced a 32-member cabinet, with the ANC holding 20 positions, the DA six (including Steenhuisen as agriculture minister), and the remainder shared among other coalition parties. While this may seem like a minor shift to the outside observer, this is the first time that the DA has been part of the government of South Africa and represents a massive shift in governance and policy. Additionally, the ANC and DA, as the dominant parties in government and opposition for much of recent history, form an unlikely partnership that is likely to result in a difficult working relationship between two ideologically opposite forces.
After the Elections
Ramaphosa and Steenhuisen on the floor of the National Assembly
Credit: Gallo Images
In the six months since the election, the South African government has struggled to fulfill many of the significant promises made by the ANC and DA. However, one major positive shift has been the dramatic decrease in load-shedding; the nation hasn’t experienced a major blackout since March 26, 2024. This improvement is largely thanks to initiatives like President Ramaphosa’s Energy Action Plan and Eskom’s Generation Operational Recovery Plan. This included a restructuring of Eskom’s leadership (which was long plagued by corruption dating back to President Zuma’s tenure), a shift toward encouraging alternative energy sources, and a $14 billion debt relief package to Eskom to fund maintenance and repairs. Although occasional power cuts still occur to protect infrastructure in high-use areas, the power situation has markedly improved over the past year in the nation.
That being said, the nation continues to grapple with severe economic inequality now accompanied by bureaucratic gridlock. Recent legislation on healthcare and education has intensified tensions between the African National Congress and the Democratic Alliance, showing major holes in the supposed “unity” of the coalition. In May, President Ramaphosa signed the National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme into law, which aims to provide universal healthcare while simultaneously banning private insurance. The DA has vehemently criticized this move, warning it could lead to significant tax increases and corruption, with costs potentially exceeding 200 billion rand (approximately 11 billion USD) annually. Despite this backlash, Ramaphosa argues that the NHI is crucial for reducing poverty and ensuring equitable access to healthcare. Legal challenges from the DA and other healthcare organizations are underway, questioning the bill’s constitutionality and its implications for private healthcare. In September, Ramaphosa signed into law an education bill that grants the government increased control over language and admission policies in schools. This legislation is viewed as a threat to Afrikaans-language schools, predominantly attended by the white Afrikaner minority. Steenhuisen and the DA warned that it undermines the constitutional right to education in students’ mother tongues and could potentially permanently destabilize the fragile GNU. While the ANC supports the bill as a means to promote inclusion for Black learners, civil society groups fear it may lead to the phasing out of Afrikaans schools in favor of English-only institutions, prompting the DA to file multiple lawsuits against the legislation shortly after its passage.
Furthermore, in October of 2024, the DA called for a review of prosecutors' decision not to charge President Cyril Ramaphosa regarding the "Farmgate" scandal, which emerged after a former intelligence official accused him of money laundering and corruption in June 2022. The scandal involves the theft of large sums of foreign currency from Ramaphosa's game farm. Ramaphosa has admitted to the break-in but disputes the amount stolen, claiming it was from legitimate game sales. While the Director of Public Prosecutions stated there was insufficient evidence for prosecution, the DA criticized the lack of transparency in this outcome, emphasizing the need for thorough scrutiny. The call for a deeper investigation into the President by a fellow coalition member demonstrates the political fragility and visible tensions within the GNU, exposing the underlying strains in what Steenhuisen himself referred to as “a marriage of inconvenience.”
The policy differences between the ANC and the DA extend beyond domestic concerns, as the two factions have very different ideas about South Africa’s role on the global stage. As a member of BRICS, South Africa under Ramaphosa and his ANC predecessors has strengthened ties with Russia and China, both of which supported the ANC during the anti-apartheid struggle. These relationships have endured since the ANC came to power, with South Africa often maintaining a stance of non-alignment on major international conflicts. This approach has strained relations with the U.S. and NATO, particularly in the context of the Ukraine war, where Ramaphosa’s refusal to condemn Russia has drawn sharp criticism from the West. In contrast, the Democratic Alliance (DA) aligns more closely with Western foreign policy, supporting Ukraine and pushing for a more critical stance on Russia. The coalition government could potentially lead to a shift in South Africa’s foreign policy; if the DA uses its leverage as a member of the GNU, South Africa could begin to align more with Western interests which would have significant implications for regional politics. Additionally, the ANC and DA have starkly different views on the Israel-Palestine conflict. The ANC under Ramaphosa has maintained a staunchly pro-Palestinian stance, filing the high-profile case in the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide. The DA, on the other hand, has historically been strongly in support of Israel but has shifted to a more neutral position following October 7th by calling for peace without strongly favoring either side. While the ANC and DA strongly disagree on what the position of South Africa should be, both parties share a commitment to increasing the country's international influence and importance on the global stage.
The political landscape of South Africa has undergone significant transformation since the recent 2024 elections, as the ANC lost its majority for the first time due to a steady decline in public trust and growing dissatisfaction with issues like corruption, economic inequality, and the energy crisis. The formation of a coalition government between the ANC and the DA, two ideologically opposing forces, represents a new era in South African politics. While the GNU has the potential to facilitate effective and collaborative solutions to issues, it also introduces significant challenges as ideological disagreements and tension among leadership are likely to complicate efforts to address the nation's pressing problems.
