Bangladesh – Revolution and Rebirth

Written by Surya Ambatipudi; Edited by Andrew Ma

Published on December 20th, 2024

A Bitter Election

Criticism and concern surrounding the Awami League, one of the two dominant parties in Bangladesh, has been rampant for the past few decades amidst accusations of electoral fraud and consolidation of state power. Over time, the League sought to systematically crush the opposition by enacting state control over judicial appointments and abolishing a mandate for a nonpartisan, caretaker government to be present between elections. Most recently, negative sentiments toward the party were reflected by public reproval of the January 2024 election results, where the incumbent Awami League declared a controversial victory. Tensions began after the opposing Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) demanded that an interim government oversee the election, to ensure that the voting process occurs fairly. This was, however, ignored by the incumbent party, leading the BNP to boycott the election altogether. The Awami League victory secured a fourth term for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was often regarded as the “Iron Lady” of Asia for the longevity of her term and economic progress under her reign. However, for everyday Bangladeshi citizens, a Hasina-led government represented a continued infringement of press, civil, and human rights. Just months before the election, the government issued crackdowns on BNP officials and supporters. Over 27,000 opposition-affiliated individuals were arrested, and thousands more were put on trial. Human rights organizations have reported jails filled beyond capacity and certain individuals tortured by electric shock. The Awami League has evidently begun taking an authoritarian shift and has become more outward with its means of doing so.

The Student Revolution

Years of political subjugation by the ruling party and several subsequent protests culminated in a two-month uprising that led to the Awami League’s rapid demise. The student revolution began at Dhaka University when students peacefully protested a High Court decision to uphold a fifty-year-old quota system that inherently excluded a large class of Bangladeshi civilians from employment. The system was designed to give preference to those who fought in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War against Pakistan, as well as their descendants. Roughly 56% of government positions were reserved for beneficiaries of the quota system, which, by 2024, had been expanded to include ethnic and religious minorities. 

The Dhaka University protest was met with violence, as members of the Bangladesh Chatra League, a student organization affiliated with the Awami League, attacked the protestors. Protests then erupted across various other universities in the country, including Begum Rokeya University in Rangpur, where a young man named Abu Sayed was publicly shot by authorities. As protests escalated, so did state-sanctioned violence and police violence. In just ten days, over 200 dissenters were killed. As the death toll rose, protestors rejected dialogue with government officials, leading Hasina’s administration to conduct mass arrests and impose internet shutdowns. Hasina herself accused the protestors of being the “grandchildren of razakars,” a derogatory term given towards people who sided with Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War. Her remarks were paralleled by a shift in the focus of the revolution, as disagreements with the quota system swelled to resentment against the authoritarian Awami League in and of itself. 

On August 5th, 2024, students gathered in central locations in Dhaka and initiated a march on the Ganabhaban, where Hasina lived. Police were reportedly unable to subdue the crowd, which was well in the thousands. Hasina was instructed to immediately flee the area and was driven out of the city, eventually escaping by air to India.

A Future in Limbo

It is not out of the ordinary for student revolutions to drive changes in leadership. In 1989 Czechoslovakia, for example, students facilitated the Velvet Revolution that challenged the authoritarian government led by Gustáv Husák, who was forced to resign. Years later, in 1998, students in Indonesia led the charge to overthrow the iron-fisted rule of Suharto. However, analysts have uniquely characterized the revolution in Bangladesh as the first successful Gen-Z uprising against an undemocratic government. Gen-Z Bangladeshis, at the forefront of the anti-Awami League struggle, have demonstrated to future leaders that they are willing to risk their lives and future to protect democracy and freedom in their nation.

Optimism and hope filled the air as a new interim government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was established. Yunus promises power back to the people and a new way forward for Bangladeshi society. Whether he will be successful in acting on his promises for the nation remains to be seen as the nation mends its fences post-revolution. Criticism towards the Yunus government has already sprouted, as he lacks policies to fight inflation, one of the most pressing economic issues the country faces. Additionally, the Awami League’s relative absence after the revolution has incentivized Islamist political parties to become more vocal, including the radical Jamaat-e-Islami party. This poses a threat to religious minorities in the nation, including Bangladeshi Hindus who continue to report attacks on their homes, property, and temples as the dust of the revolution settles. The government under Yunus must balance these considerations, prioritizing the health, safety, and security of all Bangladeshi citizens, including minorities. Though some deregulatory policies have been put in place, there is still a long way to go in terms of recovering the nation and steering it towards a path of peace and prosperity. Bangladesh must also reshape its foreign policy and navigate a newfound relationship with neighboring India, which has consistently supported the Awami League. But perhaps most importantly, the new government must not forget the reason they sit in the chambers of the Jatiya Sangsad – because the modern-day Bangladeshi masses, who vehemently reject despotism, have allowed them to be there.

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